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A CUP OF COFFEE AFTER THE WATERBOARD:
SEEMINGLY VOLUNTARY POST-ABUSE STATEMENTS
Gregory S. McNeal*
INTRODUCTION
The Obama Administration's decision to release the Office of Legal
Counsel (OLC) memos that authorized abusive interrogation tech-
niques has shed new light on what occurred at CIA black sites in an
effort to extract intelligence information from high-value detainees.1
Much commentary has focused on accountability for interrogators and
those who authorized their specific techniques.2 Similarly, many
scholars have discussed the problems with the current military com-
* Associate Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law.
1. See Obama Publishes "Torture" Memos, BBC, Apr. 16, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
americas/8003023.stm.
2. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER L. BLAKESLEY, TERRORISM AND ANTI-TERRORISM: A NORMATIVE
AND PRACTICAL ASSESSMENT (2006); HAROLD H. BRUFF, BAD ADVICE: BUSH'S LAWYERS IN
THE WAR ON TERROR (2009); DAVID COLE, TORTURE MEMOS: RATIONALIZING THE UNTHINK-
ABLE 3 (2009); THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB (Karen J. Greenberg &
Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005); TORTURE: A COLLECTION XViii (Sanford Levinson ed., 2004); JOR-
DAN J. PAUST, BEYOND THE LAW: THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S UNLAWFUL RESPONSES IN THE
"WAR" ON TERROR iX-X (2007); MARJORIE CoHmN, COWBOY REPUBLIC (2007); PHILIPPE SANDS,
TORTURE TEAM: RUMSFELD'S MEMO AND THE BETRAYAL OF AMERICAN VALUES (2008); Jos6
E. Alvarez, Torturing the Law, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 175 (2006); Diane Marie Amann,
Abu Ghraib, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2085, 2087-88 (2005); M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Institutionaliza-
tion of Torture Under the Bush Administration, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 389, 390 (2006);
Benjamin G. Davis, Refluat Stercus: A Citizen's View of Criminal Prosecution in U.S. Domestic
Courts of High-Level U.S. Civilian Authority and Military Generals for Torture and Cruel, Inhu-
man or Degrading Treatment, 23 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 503, 503 (2008); David E.
Graham, The Dual U.S. Standard for the Treatment and Interrogation of Detainees: Unlawful and
Unworkable, 48 WASHBURN L.J. 325, 352 (2009); Scott Horton, Kriegsraison or Military Neces-
sity? The Bush Administration's Wilhelmine Attitude Towards the Conduct of War, 30 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 576, 576-78 (2007); Jamie Mayerfeld, Playing by Our Own Rules: How U.S. Marginal-
ization of International Human Rights Law Led to Torture, 20 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 89, 89-93
(2007); Jennifer Moore, Practicing What We Preach: Humane Treatment for Detainees in the War
on Terror, 34 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 33, 55-56 (2006); Mary Ellen O'Connell, Affirming the
Ban on Harsh Interrogation, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 1231, 1231 (2005); Leila Nadya Sadat, Ghost Pris-
oners and Black Sites: Extraordinary Rendition Under International Law, 37 CASE W. RES. J.
INT'L L. 309, 309-11 (2006); Marlise Simons, Spanish Court Weighs Criminal Inquiry on Torture
for 6 Bush-Era Officials, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2009, at 6; Ctr. for Constitutional Rights, Impeach
Torture Architect Jay Bybee, http://ccrjustice.org/get-involved/action/impeach-torture-architect-
jay-bybee.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
missions and the problems with transitioning to Article III courts.3
Far less commentary, however, has focused on the impact those abu-
sive and coercive interrogation techniques had on statements derived
from non-abusive, non-coercive interviews. Were subsequent, legal,
and humane interviews indelibly impacted by the "taint of torture,"
regardless of how they were conducted? Accordingly, are statements
made in those subsequent noncoercive settings inadmissible on volun-
tariness grounds? The latter question is particularly salient because
Congress is considering modifying provisions of the Military Commis-
sions Act of 20064 and is specifically considering using a voluntariness
standard to test the admissibility of statements made by detainees.5
This Article highlights the fact that such a standard requires a com-
plex, fact-intensive inquiry which may mean that some inculpatory
statements made by high-value detainees will need to be excluded ei-
ther to protect the rights of the detainee or to protect the integrity of
the judiciary.
This Article explores some, but certainly not all, of the issues associ-
ated with seemingly voluntary statements that followed earlier state-
ments derived from coercion, abuse, or even torture. In light of the
goals of this Article, a few disclaimers are in order. First, the secrecy
associated with specific interrogation techniques and the possibility of
criminal liability for those who engaged in such techniques makes
writing about these issues with specificity particularly difficult. The
facts regarding how detainees were interrogated, what environment
they were in, the surrounding circumstances, and what was going
through their minds and the minds of their interrogators are left to
speculation at worst, and inferences drawn from selectively released
documents at best. Therefore, much of this Article will focus on what
is "known," based on snippets from released documents, selective
quotations, and allegations made by alleged terrorists. Second, the
3. See, e.g., BENJAMIN WITTES, LAW AND THE LONG WAR: THE FUTURE OF JUSTICE IN THE
AGE OF TERROR 164-66 (2008); Amos Guiora & John T. Parry, Debate, Light at the End of the
Pipeline? Choosing a Forum for Suspected Terrorists, 156 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 356,
359-61 (2008), http://www.pennumbra.com/debates/pdfs/terrorcourts.pdf; Gregory S. McNeal,
Institutional Legitimacy and Counterterrorism Trials, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 967, 967 (2009). Har-
vey Rishikof, Is It Time for a Federal Terrorist Court? Terrorists and Prosecutions: Problems,
Paradigms, and Paradoxes, 8 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & App. ADVOC. 1, 5 (2003); Jack L. Goldsmith &
Neal Katyal, Op-Ed., The Terrorists' Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2007, at A19; Andrew C. Mc-
Carthy & Alykhan Velshi, We Need a National Security Court 1-2 (2007) (unpublished manu-
script), http://www.defenddemocracy.org/images/stories/national%20security% 2 0court.pdf.
4. See Prosecuting Terrorists: Civilian and Military Trials for GTMO and Beyond: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2009), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/
hearings/hearing.cfm?id=4002.
5. See id. (testimony of David Kris, Assistant Attorney General for National Security), availa-
ble at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearing s/testimony.cfm?id=4002&witid=8156.
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U.S. law of interrogations generally-and voluntariness specifically-
is extremely complicated, and as one commentator argued, it can best
be described as incoherent.6
This Article proceeds in three parts. First, I briefly tell the story of
one high-value detainee, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM), the al-
leged mastermind of the September 11th attacks.7 Combining author-
ized practices from the OLC memos examining the legality of certain
interrogation techniques (sometimes referred to as "torture memos")
with released (ostensibly confidential) reports from the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), I corroborate the widely as-
serted fact that KSM and other detainees were subjected to coercive
interrogation, abuse, and perhaps torture. 8 While I take the time to
engage in some preliminary corroboration in Part II, corroborating
these allegations is not central to this Article's purpose and has been
more thoroughly explored by others. The purpose of painting this pic-
ture of alleged abuses is to set the stage for a discussion of whether
such earlier abuses, if believed, will invalidate subsequent statements
made by the victims of that abuse. Therefore, in Part II.B, I explain
the changed circumstances that the high-value detainees experienced
when they were transferred to Department of Defense custody in
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.9 I also explain how the U.S. government
recognized that its earlier interrogation tactics may have jeopardized
its legal case against the detainees and how it therefore decided to
counter those earlier mistakes by establishing "clean teams."' 0 These
clean teams were groups of interrogators who used non-abusive tech-
niques to extract inculpatory statements from detainees. The combi-
nation of these two fact patterns-the earlier pattern of abuse and the
subsequent non-abusive interrogations-are central to understanding
the complicated issues involved in trying Guantanamo detainees. The
central questions are these: Were the subsequent voluntary statements
indelibly impacted by the earlier abuses?; How far does the taint of
torture run?; And will it impact military commissions (or even Article
III court trials) of alleged terrorists?
In Part III, I attempt to synthesize which juridical tests a judge will
need to apply in order to answer these questions. I explain the volun-
tariness and totality of the circumstances tests that courts have applied
6. See M.K.B. Darmer, Beyond Bin Laden and Lindh: Confessions Law in an Age of Terror-
ism, 12 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 319, 321 (2003) (noting that "the Court's broader confes-
sions jurisprudence can best be described as incoherent").
7. See infra notes 19-27 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 28-38 and accompanying text.
9. See infra note 45 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
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in a variety of interrogation circumstances. I also highlight how fac-
tors-such as the time in between statements, whether there was a
change in the place of interrogations, whether the identity of the inter-
rogators changed, what the nature of the previous unlawful interroga-
tion methods was, and whether the illegally procured statement was
used to leverage the subsequent statement-can impact this ques-
tion.1 I also discuss the U.S. Supreme Court's "cat out of the bag
rule," which posits that once a defendant has revealed information in
an earlier statement, all subsequent statements are detrimentally im-
pacted by that revelation. I summarize courts' treatment of this rule
through the lens of a recent federal case involving extraterritorial
statements that were elicited by FBI agents after abuses by foreign
officials. 12
In Part IV, I combine the tests detailed in Part III and apply them
to the facts outlined in Part 11.13 Given the murkiness of the factual
details, this Part highlights the salient points derived from the public
disclosures regarding KSM and other high-value detainees. Part IV
also highlights the unique jurisprudential approach that a military tri-
bunal judge will need to follow under specific provisions of the Mili-
tary Commissions Act of 2006.14 Finally, I conclude the Article with
some thoughts about what impact pending legislation intended to re-
form military commissions may have on the government's ability to
try high-value al Qaeda detainees. 15
II. FROM COERCIVE INTERROGATION TO CLEAN TEAMS
A. The Coercive Interrogation Phase
The literature is replete with stories of interrogation abuses in the
war on terrorism. 16 In a statement on April 16, 2009, in conjunction
with the release of the OLC interrogation memos, President Barack
Obama referred to the secret prisons and enhanced interrogation era
11. See infra notes 57-204 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 205-222 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 229-244 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 240-244 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 245-246 and accompanying text.
16. The list of articles numbers in the hundreds. A Google Scholar search conducted by the
author for articles featuring the terms interrogation, abuse, and terrorism returned 2,740 articles.
See also supra note 2; Jenny Brooke-Condon, Extraterritorial Interrogation: The Porous Border
between Torture and U.S. Criminal Trials 60 RutrGERs L. REv. 647 (2007); John T. Parry &
Welsh S. White, Interrogating Suspected Terrorists: Should Torture Be an Option?, 63 U. Prrr. L.
REv. 743 (2001); Ronald J. Rychlak, Interrogating Terrorists: From Miranda Warnings to En-
hanced Interrogation Techniques, 44 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 451 (2007).
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as "a dark and painful chapter in our history. ' 17 Moreover, a May 7,
2004 report by the CIA Inspector General, released in redacted form,
describes waterboarding, mock executions, threats to kill or sexually
assault family members of detainees, and other interrogation methods
the CIA Inspector General labeled "inhumane." 18 For the purposes
of this Article, I accept that reports of abuse are true and instead turn
my attention to what impact prior abuses may have had on the admis-
sibility of later statements that were not derived from torture or abu-
sive techniques.
To explore this issue, I will briefly summarize the case of KSM, one
of the most prominent detainees held by the U.S. government. His
case highlights some of the problems prosecutors and courts will face
when attempting to try Guantanamo detainees. 19 KSM is the alleged
mastermind of the September 11th attacks, and his case exemplifies
the challenges associated with using evidence that has been tainted by
torture.20
KSM was captured in Rawalpindi, Pakistan on March 1, 2003 by
Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), possibly with the support of
U.S. personnel. 21 Reports indicate that KSM was held and interro-
gated in CIA secret prisons around the world until being brought to
the Guantanamo Bay detention facility in September 2006.22 While in
custody at Guantanamo Bay, KSM was not immediately interrogated,
and in March 2007, he testified before a military panel in a Combatant
Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) hearing.23 In his CSRT hearing, KSM
made a number of inculpatory statements, including claiming that he
was "responsible for the 1993 World Trade Center operation" and "re-
17. Press Release, The White House, Statement of President Barack Obama on Release
of OLC Memos (Apr. 16, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/Statement-of-
President-Barack-Obama-on-Release-of-OLC-Memos/.
18. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, SPECIAL REVIEW: COUNTERTERRORISM DETENTION
AND INTERROGATION ACTIVITIES (SEPTEMBER 2001 - OCTOBER 2003) 44 (May 7, 2004), http://
www.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/052708/052708-Special-Review.pdf.
19. I say "some" of the problems because in many respects the amount of public information
and evidence available for use against KSM makes his case an easier prosecution than the cases
of the lesser-known detainees. Nonetheless, KSM's prominence and the public information
about him make him a useful case study for this discussion.
20. Intel Dump, After the Waterboarding, http://voices.washingtonpost.com/inteldump/2008/
06/after the-waterboarding.html (June 22, 2008, 10:59 EST). Phillip Carter is now the Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs, and he is responsible for the Guantanamo
detainees, among other detention-related issues.
21. See Andrew O'Selsky, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed's Own Words Provides Glimpse into a
Terrorist's Mind, BEAUFORT GAZETrE, Mar. 15, 2007, http://news.google.com/newspapers?
nid=1998&dat=20070315&id=YI4iAAAAIBAJ&sjid=maoFAAAAIBAJ&pg=2756,2730446.
22. See id.
23. See Dep't of Def., Verbatim Transcript of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Hearing for
ISN 10024, http://www.defenselink.millnews/transcript_ISN10024.pdf.
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sponsible for the 9/11 operation, from A to Z."'24 The Pentagon's
transcript of the hearing also noted that KSM complained that he had
been tortured while in CIA custody. 25 According to the transcript,
KSM was asked if he made statements because of the torture. He
responded, "I ah cannot remember now," but the rest of his sentence
and other remarks on that point were redacted. 26 Later in the hear-
ing, KSM said he and other prisoners had made false statements dur-
ing interrogation, apparently under torture. 27 He submitted a written
statement about his alleged torture, but that statement has not been
cleared for release by the U.S. government.
The release of the OLC memos examining the legality of certain
interrogation techniques and confidential ICRC reports has shed new
light on the type of abuse inflicted on KSM while in custody. Specifi-
cally, these documents confirm earlier reports that indicated that
KSM was subjected to various forms of physical coercion, including
waterboarding. Waterboarding consists of immobilizing an individual
and pouring water over his face to simulate drowning, which produces
a severe gag reflex. The technique makes the subject believe that
death is imminent. Some debate whether this tactic amounts to tor-
ture, but it nonetheless rises to the level of abuse, which would call
into question the voluntariness of any statement that followed the
technique.28
The OLC memos detail specific techniques that were authorized for
use by CIA interrogators. 29 These memos, when compared with con-
fidential ICRC documents that detail the treatment of detainees (as
told by them), indicate the type of conduct authorized by the U.S.
24. Id. at 18.
25. See id. at 7, 14.
26. Id. at 15.
27. See id. at 14-15.
28. See supra note 2 (collecting sources).
29. These memos are archived at the ACLU's website, http://www.aclu.org/accountability/
olc.html. See Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney
General, Office of Legal Counsel, to John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central
Intelligence Agency (May 30, 2005), http://luxmedia.vo.llnwd.net/olO/clients/aclu/olc-
05302005_bradbury.pdf [hereinafter May 30 Memo]; Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury,
Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel to John A. Rizzo, Senior
Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency (May 10, 2005), http://luxmedia.
vo.llnwd.net/ol0/clients/aclu/olc_05102005-bradbury-20pg.pdf; Memorandum from Steven G.
Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, to John A.
Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency (May 10, 2005), http://
luxmedia.vo.llnwd.net/ol0/clients/aclu/olc_05102005_bradbury46pg.pdf [hereinafter First May 10
Memo]; Memorandum from Jay Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, to
John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency (August 1, 2002), http://
luxmedia.vo.llnwd.net/ol0/clients/aclu/olc_08012002-bybee.pdf.
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government, and the ICRC documents corroborate the fact that the
authorized conduct was actually engaged in by interrogators. 30 Two
specific techniques-"stress positions" and "waterboarding"-have
been corroborated by ICRC documents.
31
The OLC authorized stress positions as described below:
There are three stress positions that may be used. You have in-
formed us that these positions are not designed to produce the pain
associated with contortions or twisting of the body. Rather, like
wall standing, they are designed to produce the physical discomfort
associated with temporary muscle fatigue. The three stress posi-
tions are (1) sitting on the floor with legs extended straight out in
front and arms raised above the head, (2) kneeling on the floor
while leaning back at a 45 degree angle, and (3) leaning against a
wall generally about three feet away from the detainee's feet, with
only the detainee's head touching the wall, while his wrists are
handcuffed in front of him or behind his back, and while an interro-
gator stands next to him to prevent injury if he loses his balance. As
with wall standing, we understand that these positions are used only
to induce temporary muscle fatigue.3
2
The ICRC describes the claims of detainees generally, and KSM
specifically, as it related to the implementation of this legal policy as
being
subjected to prolonged stress standing positions, during which their
wrists were shackled to a bar or hook in the ceiling above the head
for periods ranging from two or three days continuously, and for up
to two or three months intermittently. All those detainees who re-
ported being held in this position were allegedly kept naked
throughout the use of this form of ill-treatment.
While being held in this position some of the detainees were al-
lowed to defecate in a bucket. A guard would come to release their
hands from the bar or hook in the ceiling so that they could sit on
the bucket. None of them, however, were allowed to clean them-
selves afterwards. Others were made to wear a garment that resem-
bled a diaper....
Many of the detainees who alleged that they had undergone this
form of ill-treatment commented that their legs and ankles swelled
as a result of the continual forced standing with their hands shack-
led above their head. They also noted that while being held in this
position they were checked frequently by US health personnel.33
30. INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, REPORT ON THE TREATMENT OF FOURTEEN "HIGH
VALUE DETAINEES" IN CIA CUSTODY [hereinafter ICRC REPORT], http://www.nybooks.com/
icrc-report.pdf.
31. Id. at 8-10.
32. First May 10 Memo, supra note 29, at 34.
33. ICRC REPORT, supra note 30, at 11-12.
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Similarly, according to the ICRC report,
[KSM] alleged that, apart from the time when he was taken for in-
terrogation, he was shackled in the prolonged stress standing posi-
tion for one month in his third place of detention (he estimates he
was interrogated for approximately eight hours each day at the start
of the month gradually declining to four hours each day at the end
of the month). 34
Stress positions were not the only type of conduct authorized by the
OLC; interrogators also were authorized to use the waterboarding
technique, and released documents confirm that the technique was
used hundreds of times:
In this technique, the detainee is lying on a gurney that is inclined at
an angle of 10 to 15 degrees to the horizontal, with the detainee on
his back and his head toward the lower end of the gurney. A cloth
is placed over the detainee's face, and cold water is poured on the
cloth from a height of approximately 6 to 18 inches. The wet cloth
creates a barrier through which it is difficult or in some cases not
possible to breathe. A single application of water may not last for
more than 40 seconds, with the duration of an application measured
from the moment when water of whatever quantity is first poured
onto the cloth until the moment when the cloth is removed from the
subject's face. 35
A May 30, 2005 memo found,
The CIA used the waterboard "at least 83 times during August
2002" in the interrogation of Zubaydah, IG Report at 90, and 183
times during March 2003 in the interrogation of [KSM]. 36
ICRC documents confirm the information contained in the OLC
memos generally, and their use against KSM specifically. According
to the ICRC, KSM stated,
[I] would be strapped to a special bed, which can be rotated into a
vertical position. A cloth would be placed over my face. Water was
then poured onto the cloth by one of the guards so that I could not
breathe. This obviously could only be done for one or two minutes
at a time. The cloth was then removed and the bed was put into a
vertical position. The whole process was then repeated during
about 1 hour.3 7
The ICRC documents then provide,
The procedure was applied during five different sessions during the
first month of interrogation in [KSM's] third place of detention. He
also said that injuries to his ankles and wrists occurred during the
suffocation as he struggled in the panic of not being able to breathe.
34. Id. at 11.
35. First May 10 Memo, supra note 29, at 15.
36. May 30 Memo, supra note 29, at 37.
37. ICRC REPORT, supra note 30, at 10.
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As during other forms of ill-treatment he was always kept naked
during the suffocation. Female interrogators were also present dur-
ing this form of ill-treatment, again increasing the humiliation
aspect. 38
The legitimacy of KSM's confessions is in question because many of
his statements are the product of torture or abusive treatment.39
B. The "Clean Team" Phase
As noted earlier, KSM was transferred to Guantanamo from CIA
custody. In a speech on September 6, 2006, President George W.
Bush stated,
I'm announcing today that [KSM], Abu Zubaydah, Ramzi bin al-
Shibh, and 11 other terrorists in CIA custody have been transferred
to the United States Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay. They are be-
ing held in the custody of the Department of Defense. As soon as
Congress acts to authorize the military commissions I have pro-
posed, the men our intelligence officials believe orchestrated the
deaths of nearly 3,000 Americans on September the 11th, 2001, can
face justice.40
A key question that faced prosecutors at the Office of Military
Commissions41 in light of these transfers was, "Do we question the
detainees again using a 'clean team' of law enforcement personnel in
an effort to obtain admissions independent of what they said in CIA
custody, or do we preserve the status quo in hopes the military judges
might admit some of their earlier admissions?"4 2 Prosecutors believed
that
the methods employed to elicit information from the high value de-
tainees prior to their transfer to Department of Defense (DOD)
custody caused the prosecution team to doubt that any of their post-
capture statements would be admissible at trial, even though the
evidentiary rules in military commissions are more lenient than the
rules in federal courts and courts-martial. 43
38. Id. (emphasis omitted).
39. See O'Selsky, supra note 21.
40. President George W. Bush, Trying Detainees: Address on the Creation of Military Com-
missions (Sept. 6, 2006), http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/09.06.06.html.
41. In the interest of full disclosure, I should note that from 2006 to 2007 I was a legal consult-
ant to Morris D. Davis, the Chief Prosecutor for the Department of Defense Office of Military
Commissions.
42. Morris D. Davis, Historical Perspective on Guantanamo Bay-The Arrival of the High
Value Detainees, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L. L. 115, 118 (2009).
43. Id. at 117-18.
Because military commissions must try crimes based on evidence collected everywhere
from the battlefields in Afghanistan to foreign terrorist safe houses, we believe that the
Code of Military Commissions should provide for the introduction of all probative evi-
dence, including hearsay evidence, where such evidence is reliable .... Court-martial
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Former Assistant Attorney General for National Security, Kenneth
Wainstein, described the situation after the transfer of these detainees
as one of "building cases and anticipating the challenges down the
road." 44 Once KSM and others were charged with capital crimes, a
"clean team" of FBI and military law enforcement agents was
deployed to obtain admissions from some of the high-value detainees
"without the use of coercive interrogation tactics., 45 According to the
former chief prosecutor,
The decision to create the "clean teams" and initiate fresh inter-
views was made after much discussion and debate, but it was our
collective belief that we did not have much to lose by trying.
We anticipated three potential outcomes to the clean team effort.
In the best case, the detainee would agree to talk and voluntarily
provide the same or similar information as that provided while in
CIA custody. We hoped "clean" admissions would allows us to in-
troduce the statements made to law enforcement personnel, using
them as witnesses at trial, and eliminate or at least minimize CIA
involvement in courtroom proceedings. The status quo outcome
was the detainee would refuse to talk and we would proceed with
what we already had in hand. The worst-case scenario was the de-
tainee would agree to meet with the clean team, but would only talk
about alleged mistreatment while in the CIA program. Rather than
bolstering the prosecution's case, allegations of abuse required fur-
ther investigation and might leave the prosecution in a weaker
position.46
Scholars and human rights advocates have noted the problems with
using these clean teams and other evidence against the detainees.47
rules of evidence track those in civilian courts, reflecting the fact that the overwhelming
majority of court-martial prosecutions arise from every-day violations of the military
code of conduct, far from the battlefield. By contrast, military commissions must per-
mit the introduction of a broader range of evidence, including hearsay statements, be-
cause many witnesses are likely to be foreign nationals who are not amenable to
process, and other witnesses may be unavailable because of military necessity, incarcer-
ation, injury, or death. In this respect, the Code of Military Commissions follows the
practice of international war crimes tribunals, which similarly recognize the need for
broad evidentiary rules when dealing with evidence obtained under conditions of war.
Id. at 118 n.5 (quoting Hearing on Military Commissions and Standards Utilized in Trying De-
tainees Before the H. Armed Servs. Comm., 109th Cong. 56 (2006) (prepared statement of Acting
Assistant Att'y Gen. Stephen J. Bradbury), available at http://armedservices.house.gov/comdocs/
schedules/9-7-06BradburyStatement.pdf (last visited Oct. 16, 2009)).
44. Scott Shane & David Johnston, U.S. Acts to Avert Tactic Expected in Qaeda Trial: Prison-
ers Reinterviewed by "Clean Teams," N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2008, at A16.
45. Josh White, Dan Eggen & Joby Warrick, U.S. to Try 6 on Capital Charges over 9/11 At-
tacks, WASH. POST, Feb. 12, 2008, at Al.
46. Davis, supra note 42, at 120-21.
47. See Alan Clarke, Creating a Torture Culture, 32 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 1, 41 (2008)
(noting that "so-called 'clean' teams are now re-interrogating detainees who have been tortured,
so as to try to paint their confessions as having been obtained humanely").
[Vol. 59:943
2010] A CUP OF COFFEE AFTER THE WATERBOARD 953
For example, Kenneth Roth, the Executive Director of Human Rights
Watch, has noted that his review of the CSRT transcripts reveals that
"the government has actually gone out of its way to introduce evi-
dence that is not interrogation related because it knows that is has an
interrogation problem. '48 Examples of such evidence include infor-
mation from seized computers, cell phones, cell phone numbers, and
other physical objects. 49 According to Roth, the government
has established what it is calling "clean teams." These are brand
new interrogators that come into Guantanamo and are reinvestigat-
ing these suspects without ever looking at their original interroga-
tion. The idea is they are supposedly not tainted by that coerced
interrogation and therefore the evidence that they come up with can
be used to prosecute the suspect.50
From those who have witnessed the clean team interviews, two
things are clear. First, the detainees were not Mirandized.51 Second,
the environment was intended to be comfortable and collegial, not
threatening and abusive. "[T]he FBI[ ] went to extraordinary lengths
to explain to each detainee that his decision to talk or not talk was a
purely voluntary choice and there would be no punishment nor re-
ward tied to the decision." 52 As a result of these efforts, most of the
high-value detainees chose to cooperate with the clean teams that
"used a non-confrontational, rapport-building approach to facilitate
During an examination of Brig. Gen. Thomas Hartmann regarding the allegations of
unlawful command influence, John Adams Project lawyer Jeff Robinson pressed him
on the review of evidence obtained by torture when he was the legal advisor to the
Convening Authority. Gen. Hartmann introduced a new phrase into the lexicon of
absolution from torture. Speaking of the evidence obtained by so-called "clean teams"
(as opposed to the same evidence earlier obtained by torture), Gen. Hartmann em-
braced this evidence as acceptable under the attenuation analysis.
Jack King, NACDL Sends Criminal Justice Advice to Obama Transition Team, 32 CHAMPION,
Jan. 2009, at 12, 14; see also Marjorie Cohn, Injustice at Guantanamo: Torture Evidence and the
Military Commissions Act, JURIST, Feb. 15, 2008, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2008/02/injus-
tice-at-guantanamo-torture.php; Benjamin G. Davis, No Third Class Processes for Foreigners,
103 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 88, 98 (2008) (commenting on "clean teams" and arguing that
courts should more openly examine the claim that the combination of "interrogators who had no
knowledge or participation in torture coming after other interrogators had tortured," and that a
"lack of judicial toughness with regard to the Fifth Amendment and coercion in the military
judge's exercise of discretion" seals the fate of many detainees); Gregory S. McNeal, Beyond
Guantdnamo, Obstacles and Options, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOoUY 29, 47-50 (2009) (discuss-
ing problems with admissibility of statements, classified information, and challenges transition-
ing from military commissions to Article III courts).
48. Kenneth Roth, Why the Current Approach to Fighting Terrorism Is Making Us Less Safe,
41 CREIGHTON L. REV. 579, 587 (2008).
49. See id.
50. Id.
51. See Davis, supra note 42, at 122; see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (requiring pre-
interrogation warnings for criminal suspects).
52. Davis, supra note 42, at 121.
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dialogue with those that decided to talk."'53 Generally, the discussions
continued for days, or in some cases, for months.54 The environment
was, according to Colonel Davis, one of collegiality, with occasional
laughter and no intimidation or fear.55 "The dynamic was one of mu-
tual respect, like soldiers from opposite sides sitting down over coffee
after the war is over to reflect on their past battles." 56
The facts detailed above demonstrate that there were two phases of
the interrogation of high-value Guantanamo detainees such as KSM.
In the first phase, the detainees were subjected to coercive interroga-
tion techniques that bordered on abuse or even torture. In the second
phase, detainees were interviewed in the environment that was lik-
ened to a conversation over a cup of coffee. The question these facts
raise is whether a subsequent voluntary statement, even over a cup of
coffee, can ever be fully separated from an earlier coerced involuntary
statement, thus rendering the subsequent statement admissible. 57
III. WHAT TESTS GOVERN WHETHER THE CLEAN STATEMENTS
ARE ADMISSIBLE AT TRIAL?
As the facts detailed above illustrate, some Guantanamo detainees
were subjected to unlawful interrogation, followed by subsequent law-
ful interrogations. Public accounts indicate that earlier coercive inter-
rogations were followed by "clean teams" that presumably conducted
interrogations in compliance with constitutional and Common Article
3 safeguards. 58 A task for a reviewing court will be to determine the
admissibility of these subsequent "clean" statements on voluntariness
grounds, based on the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
interrogation and the detainee's statement.59 Under the totality of the
53. Id.
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. Id. (noting that "[t]he question of whether the high value detainees would be willing to
talk was soon answered and I began to wonder if they would ever stop").
57. This Article does not address the important issue of the abuse itself, but rather focuses on
the admissibility of voluntary statements that follow abuse. See Norman Abrams et al., Ten
Questions on National Security, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 5007, 5016 (2008), noting that
[i]n Karake, non-U.S. citizens interrogated by non-U.S. police in a foreign country were
given the benefit of the protection of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause in a
U.S. courtroom. But, as the Bin Laden court pointed out, that protection operates
when the statements are offered into evidence in a U.S. courtroom, not at the time the
coerced statements are obtained.
58. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
59. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding that, under the "totality of circum-
stances" test, a statement made by a suspect after unlawful interrogation by state agents, fol-
lowed by interrogation by FBI agents in compliance with proper procedures, should be
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circumstances, a court "must determine whether the subsequent state-
ment is sufficiently removed from the milieu of the coerced statement
so as to preclude any lingering taint."'60 In other words, for a court to
find a subsequent statement admissible, the court must be adequately
satisfied that the coercive setting that tainted the preceding statement
has "sufficiently dissipated so as to make the second statement volun-
tary.'"61 To fully understand the gravamen of this question, it is neces-
sary to examine the complex and inconsistent U.S. jurisprudence
dealing with the voluntariness of statements following earlier involun-
tary statements.62
The Supreme Court held in Lyons v. Oklahoma that no per se rule
of exclusion applies to statements that are given after an earlier invol-
untary statement has been made.63 In Lyons, the petitioner was ar-
rested and subjected to an overnight interrogation during which a
confession was obtained. 64 Later that afternoon, he gave and signed a
subsequent confession. 65 The Court held that although the first con-
fession was involuntary and therefore could not be used at trial, the
subsequent confessions did not necessarily violate Fourteenth Amend-
ment due process. 66 The test for voluntariness is whether the accused
at the time he confesses is in possession of mental freedom to confess
or to deny a suspected participation in a crime.67
In Lyons, the petitioner was arrested and immediately interrogated
at a jail for approximately two hours.68 After he had been in jail for
eleven days, he was questioned again in the prosecutor's office. 69
suppressed in federal court because as far as the defendant was concerned it was one interroga-
tion process).
60. United States v. Marenghi, 109 F.3d 28, 32 (1st Cir. 1997).
61. United States v. Lopez, 437 F.3d 1059, 1066 (10th Cir. 2006). The Lopez court held that
the defendant murder suspect's second confession was involuntary-because the coercion that
produced his first confession had not dissipated, even though his second confession came almost
twelve hours after his first, following a night's sleep and meal-where his first confession was
induced primarily by an agent's improper promise of leniency, the same agent was the interroga-
tor during the next interview, the second interview took place in the same location as the earlier
interrogation, and the defendant had not spoken to an attorney or a family member during the
twenty-four hours that he had been in custody. See id. at 1060-62.
62. Importantly, this Article only provides a brief sketch of one aspect of the jurisprudence on
voluntariness. For a more detailed exploration, see generally JOSEPH D. GRANO, CONFESSIONS,
TRUTH, AND THE LAW ch. 4 (1993); Gerald M. Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 VAND. L. REV.
1417 (1985); Catherine Hancock, Due Process Before Miranda, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2195 (1996).
63. See Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596, 603 (1944).
64. Id. at 598.
65. Id. at 600.
66. Id. at 605.
67. Id. at 602.
68. See id. at 598.
69. See id.
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"This interrogation began about six-thirty in the evening," and the pe-
titioner confessed "between two and four" the following morning.70
After the early morning confession, the petitioner "was taken to the
scene of the crime and subjected to further questioning about the in-
struments used to commit the murders."'v A second confession was
obtained and signed later in the day.72 The overnight questioning was
"the basis of the objection to the introduction [of] evidence of [the]
second confession. '73 "There was also a third [oral] confession ...
admitted at trial without objection by petitioner. ' 74 Counsel was not
provided to the petitioner until after his confessions.75 At trial, the
petitioner testified about "physical abuse by the police officers at the
time of his arrest[,] . . . first interrogation[,]" and second interroga-
tion.76 Although the beating was denied by the officers who were ac-
cused of participating in it, 77 disinterested witnesses testified to the
use of force against the petitioner.78 The petitioner challenged the
overnight questioning and argued that the events alleged showed that
his later confession was involuntary.79
Citing Lisenba v. California,0 the Court noted that "[t]he mere
questioning of a suspect while in the custody of police officers is not
prohibited either as a matter of common law or due process, ' 81 and
that there is no set formula for determining whether a confession vio-
lates the Fourteenth Amendment.82 In Lyons, improper methods
were used to obtain the early morning confession, but that confession
was not used at trial.8 3 However, the Court noted that
involuntary confessions, of course, may be given either simultane-
ously with or subsequently to unlawful pressures, force or threats.
The question of whether [a subsequent confession is] voluntary de-
pends on the inferences as to the continuing effect of the coercive
practices which may fairly be drawn from the surrounding circum-
stances. The voluntary or involuntary character of a confession is
70. Id.
71. Id. at 600.
72. See id. at 598.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See id. at 599.
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. See id. at 600.
80. 314 U.S. 219 (1941).
81. Id. at 601 (citing Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 239-41 (1941); Ziang Sung Wan v.
United States, 266 U.S. 1, 14 (1924)).
82. See Lyons, 322 U.S. at 600.
83. See id. at 599-600.
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determined by a conclusion as to whether the accused, at the time
he confesse[d], [was] in possession of "mental freedom" to confess
to or deny a suspected participation in a crime. 84
In short, the admissibility of a later confession depends on whether
it was voluntary, and the effect of earlier abuse may render the subse-
quent confession involuntary. However, if the relation between the
earlier and later confession is not so close that it must be said that the
facts of one control the character of the other, the inference is for the
triers of fact. If the trier of fact finds that the confession should be
admitted as voluntary, such a decision cannot be a denial of due pro-
cess.85 In Lyons, "[t]here was evidence from others present that Ly-
ons readily confessed without any show of force or threats," and that
the confession came "within a very short time of his surrender to [the]
[w]arden ... .-"86 Based on this evidence, the Court held that Lyons's
second confession was voluntary and therefore admissible at trial. 87
The lesson of Lyons for voluntary statements is that the existence of
a statement obtained under circumstances that preclude its admissibil-
ity does not perpetually disable a defendant from making an admissi-
ble statement once the coercive conditions have been removed. 88 On
the other hand, that a defendant has already made an involuntary
statement "is a strong indication that later statements were not the
product of his free will." 89 "The admissibility of the later confession
[ultimately] depends upon the same test-is it voluntary." 90 Two juridi-
cal approaches to determining voluntariness are particularly apt with
regard to Guantanamo detainees. The first is the "totality of circum-
84. Id. at 600 (citations omitted) (citing Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 323 U.S. 143, 154 (1944)). In
Ashcraft, the Court held 6-3 that a confession was "compelled" under circumstances that didn't
involve physical force, but rather involved psychological pressure. Ashcraft, 322 U.S. at 153.
The Court stated that "[f]or thirty-six hours after Ashcraft's seizure during which period he was
held incommunicado, without sleep or rest, relays of officers, experienced investigators, and
highly trained lawyers questioned him without respite." Id. Such circumstances rendered the
situation "so inherently coercive that its very existence is irreconcilable with the possession of
mental freedom by a lone suspect against whom its full coercive force is brought to bear." Id. at
154.
85. See Lyons, 322 US at 603.
86. See id. at 604.
87. Id. at 605.
88. See generally, e.g., United States v. Karake, 443 F. Supp. 2d 8, 94 (D.D.C. 2006) (holding
that defendants' confessions to U.S. officials were involuntary where the defendants-who were
charged with murdering two U.S. tourists in Uganda-confessed to Rwandan officials after a
period of abuse and subsequently confessed to U.S. officials; the second confessions were
deemed involuntary because the Rwandan officials continued to be involved in interrogations,
the defendants remained in Rwandan custody during interrogations, and there was no relief
from repeated beatings prior to interrogation by U.S. officials).
89. Holleman v. Duckworth, 700 F.2d 391, 396 (7th Cir. 1983).
90. Lyons, 322 U.S. at 602.
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stances" rule; the second is the "cat out of the bag" rule. 91 These tests
are grounded in the notion advanced in Lyons that prior illegal ques-
tioning can influence a defendant's subsequent statements during
what amounts to an otherwise legal interrogation.
A. Voluntariness and the Totality of the Circumstances
When inquiring into whether the initial coercion has "sufficiently
dissipated," a court is looking to find out if, in providing the subse-
quent statement, "the defendant's will has been overborne and his ca-
pacity for self-determination critically impaired." 92  Several
determining factors that contribute to this "totality of circumstances"
analysis include (1) the amount of time between statements; (2)
whether there was a change in the place of interrogations; (3) whether
the identity of the interrogators changed; (4) the nature of the previ-
ous unlawful interrogation methods; and (5) whether the illegally pro-
cured statement was used to leverage the subsequent statement.93
Other relevant factors may include the youth or advanced age of the
defendant, his level of education, or even his low intelligence. 94 The
government bears the burden of proving a subsequent statement's vol-
untariness by a preponderance of the evidence. 95 And in the absence
of a clear record indicating that the coercive atmosphere during the
first statement has been dispelled, courts are inclined to find suc-
ceeding statements involuntary.96
91. See, e.g., Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 197-98 (1957) (noting that the test to be applied
requires "a weighing of the circumstances of pressure against the power of resistance of the
person confessing. What would be overpowering to the weak of will or mind might be utterly
ineffective against an experienced criminal."); United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 540-41
(1947).
Of course, after an accused has once let the cat out of the bag by confessing, no matter
what the inducement, he is never thereafter free of the psychological and practical dis-
advantages of having confessed. He can never get the cat back in the bag. The secret is
out for good. In such a sense, a later confession always may be looked upon as fruit of
the first. But this Court has never gone so far as to hold that making a confession
under circumstances which preclude its use, perpetually disables the confessor from
making a usable one after those conditions have been removed.
Bayer, 331 U.S. at 540-41.
92. Karake, 443 F. Supp. 2d at 50, 87.
93. Id.
94. See id. at 51.
95. See id. at 52.
96. See, e.g., Harney v. United States, 407 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1969); Brewer v. State, 386 So. 2d
232 (Fla. 1980); State v. Kase, 344 N.W.2d 223 (Iowa 1984) (holding a second confession inad-
missible, even though the defendant consulted with counsel between the two confessions be-
cause the promise not to prosecute, which had induced the defendant's first confession, had not
been retracted prior to the second confession, thereby rendering it involuntary); People v.
Champion, 711 N.Y.S.2d 650 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000) (noting that to be effective, Miranda warn-
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B. Dissipation
Dissipation is another factor to consider. For example, in Brewer v.
State, the Florida Supreme Court found that the coercion inherent in
the defendant's first confession was not dissipated by the defendant's
appearance before a magistrate who advised the defendant of his
rights.97 In Brewer, police officers arrested the defendant after a body
was discovered with a knife that was later identified as belonging to
the defendant. 98 After advising the defendant of his rights, "the of-
ficers raised the [possibility] of the electric chair [and] suggested that
they had the power to" affect the leniency of the appellant's punish-
ment if he confessed to the murder. 99 "It was under the influence of
these threats and promises that the appellant made an oral confession
[to the murder]." 100 After the initial interrogation by the officers,
"the [defendant] had his first appearance before a county court judge"
who informed him of his rights.101 "After [the] first appearance, the
[defendant] went back into the custody of the same officers who per-
formed the initial, tape-recorded interrogation. They told him they
wanted a written statement. The [defendant] wrote out a confession
and signed it. The written confession was admitted into evidence over
[defendant]'s objection. '10 2
The court examined the totality of the circumstances surrounding
the written confession and found that the confession was not
voluntary: 0 3
In a state prosecution, the standard by which the voluntariness of a
confession is to be determined is the same as that which applies to
federal prosecutions ....
... [T]he inquiry is whether the confession was "free and volun-
tary... [I]t must not be extracted by any sort of threats or violence,
nor obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight
104
Furthermore, the court stated that at the time of the confession, "the
mind of the defendant [must] be free to act uninfluenced by either
ings must precede custodial interrogation of a suspect: "Later is too late, unless there is such a
definite, pronounced break in the interrogation that the defendant may be said to have returned,
in effect, to the status of one who is not under the influence of questioning.").
97. See Brewer, 386 So. 2d at 237.
98. See id. at 233.
99. Id. at 235.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 237.
104. Id. at 235 (quoting Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1897)).
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hope or fear.' 10 5 And the confession should be excluded if at the time
it was made, the defendant was "delude[d] ... as to his true position,"
or his mind was under "improper and undue influence. ' 10 6 Here, the
court held "that the intervention of [the] appearance before a" trial
judge between the two confessions "was not sufficient to break the
stream of events and dissipate the coercive influences exerted on the
appellant." 07
Similarly, in Harney v. United States, the Fifth Circuit examined
whether a prior custodial interrogation without proper warnings
makes inadmissible subsequent in-custody statements that were given
during interrogation and after appropriate warning, and the court re-
solved this question with reference to the surrounding facts and cir-
cumstances. In Harney, the appellant was stopped in the early
morning for a traffic violation.' 08 Before leaving the scene and after
being questioned by the police officer, the appellant confessed that he
was a felon. 10 9 The officer thought that the car driven by the appel-
lant was stolen and took the appellant into the police station where he
read him insufficient Miranda warnings and subjected him to further
interrogation. 011 The appellant was held in jail overnight and ques-
tioned the following morning by a detective who also read him insuffi-
cient Miranda warnings."' The appellant orally confessed and signed
a typewritten statement prepared by the detective.112 Later that after-
noon, after the appellant had eaten lunch, he was again interrogated,
this time by an FBI agent who gave him sufficient Miranda warn-
ings.11 3 The appellant made a full confession to the FBI agent, which
the agent wrote out and the appellant signed." 4
In examining these facts, the court reasoned that the first written
statement obtained by the police officer "was violative of appellant's
constitutional rights because it arose from ... coercive .... custodial
interrogation without constitutionally required warnings."'" 5 The
court noted "that prior custodial interrogation without proper warn-
ings does not automatically make inadmissible subsequent in-custody
105. Id. (quoting Frazier v. State, 107 So. 2d 16, 21 (Fla. 1958)).
106. Id. at 235-36 (quoting Frazier, 107 So. 2d at 21).
107. Id. at 237.
108. See Harney v. United States, 407 F.2d 586, 587 (5th Cir. 1969).
109. See id.
110. See id. at 587-88.
111. See id.
112. See id.
113. See id.
114. See id. at 589.
115. Id.
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statements given during interrogation after appropriate warning." 116
Rather, the facts and circumstances must be examined to determine
the existence and extent of the relationship between the unconstitu-
tional conduct and the subsequent confession.1 17 In this case, eleven
hours passed between the investigation by the second police officer
and the commencement of the FBI investigation.1 8 In that time, the
appellant was questioned by two different officers, and he gave "one
full oral and one full written and signed confession."11 9 Each interro-
gation took place in the same police headquarters and each drew from
its predecessors. 120 The FBI agent began "his interrogation 'armed
with defendant's earlier admissions.'" 21 The statement given to the
FBI agent was based on the prior illegal confessions, and therefore,
should not have been admitted at trial.' 22
The lapse in time between the illegal and legal interrogation may be
enough to render the initial coercive environment sufficiently dissi-
pated.123 However, the temporal proximity of the two statements,
while significant, is not determinative. Courts generally require that
any lapse in time between statements be coupled with other mitigating
factors. 124
In Taylor v. Alabama, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the fact
that a petitioner was taken to a police station, given Miranda warn-
ings, fingerprinted, questioned, and placed in a lineup was insufficient
to break the connection between his illegal arrest and his confession.
The Court therefore reversed the ruling of the Alabama supreme
court and held that the confession was not purged of the primary
116. Id. (citing Westover v. United States, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)).
117. See id.
118. See id.
119. Id.
120. See id.
121. Id. (quoting United States v. Pierce, 397 F.2d 128, 131 (4th Cir. 1968)).
122. See id. at 590.
123. See Leon v. Wainwright, 734 F.2d 770, 770 (11th Cir. 1984).
124. See, e.g., Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556, 589 (1954). The Court held that when a promise
of leniency is made,
a presumption arises that it continues to operate on the mind of the accused. But a
showing of a variety of circumstances can overcome that presumption. The length of
time elapsing between the promise and the confession, the apparent authority of the
person making the promise, whether the confession is made to the same person who
offered leniency, and the explicitness and persuasiveness of the inducement are among
the many factors to be weighed.
Id.; United States v. Merenghi, 109 F.3d 28, 33 (1st Cir. 1997) (noting that to determine the issue
of lingering coercion from a prior statement a court must "compare and contrast the circum-
stances surrounding each of the two statements. In so doing, we look to several factors: the
change in the place of the interrogations; the time that passed between the statements; and the
change in the identity of the interrogators.").
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taint.125 The petitioner, Taylor, was arrested on charges that he
robbed a grocery store; the arrest was conducted without a warrant or
probable cause and was based merely on an informant's tip.12 6 The
petitioner "was fingerprinted, readvised of his Miranda rights, ques-
tioned, and placed in a lineup."'1 27 He was told "that his fingerprints
matched those on grocery items handled by one of the participants in
the robbery. ' 128 Following a brief visit with his girlfriend, he signed a
written confession. 129
The U.S. Supreme Court had previously held "that a confession ob-
tained through custodial interrogation after an illegal arrest should be
excluded unless intervening events break the causal connection be-
tween the illegal arrest and the confession so that the confession is
'sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint."130 The
"Court identified several factors that should be considered in deter-
mining whether a confession has been purged of the taint of the illegal
arrest [including] 'the temporal proximity of the arrest and the confes-
sion, the presence of intervening circumstances,... and, particularly,
the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct.'",131
In terms particularly relevant to debates over the Guantanamo de-
tainees, the U.S. Supreme Court noted that because "the confession
may be 'voluntary' for purposes of the Fifth Amendment, in the sense
that Miranda warnings were given and understood, [this] is not by it-
self sufficient to purge the taint of the illegal arrest."'1 32 In Taylor,
"the petitioner was arrested without probable cause in the hope that
something would turn up, and he confessed shortly thereafter without
any meaningful intervening event. ' ' 133 The Court reasoned that "a dif-
ference of a few hours," during which the "petitioner was in police
custody, unrepresented by counsel, .. . questioned on several occa-
sions, fingerprinted, and subjected to a lineup" is not a sufficient
break in the chain of events. 134 The Court held that the "petitioner's
confession was the fruit of his illegal arrest" and was therefore
inadmissible.'1 35
125. See Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687 (1982)
126. See id. at 689.
127. Id. at 689.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 689.
130. Id. at 690 (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 602 (1975)).
131. Id. (quoting Brown, 422 U.S. at 603-04).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 691.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 694.
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In an Eleventh Circuit case, Leon v. Wainwright, a defendant's sec-
ond confession was deemed voluntary, even when given only five
hours after a confession that was induced by police officers who re-
peatedly shoved and abused the defendant. 136 In the five-hour in-
terim, the defendant was brought to the police station, advised of his
rights, then moved to a different room and questioned by different
officers. 137 The Court noted that the applicable standard for deter-
mining whether a subsequent confession is voluntary is whether, tak-
ing into consideration the totality of the circumstances, the statement
is the product of the accused's free and rational choice, and is not
extracted by any sort of threats of violence. 38 Here, the necessity of
saving the victim's life in the first confession, the different physical
setting, the different group of questioning officers, and the explana-
tion to the defendant of his rights were held to constitute a break in
the stream of events, thereby dissipating the effects of the first
coercion.139
In another case, United States v. Marenghi, the First Circuit noted
some of the considerations that would demonstrate a dissipation of
the taint of an earlier coercion.1 40 In Marenghi, the defendant was
pulled over and police officers used questionably coercive techniques
to obtain a statement without advising her of her Miranda rights.1 41
The defendant later confessed at the police station. In evaluating the
case, the court noted that the test for voluntariness of a subsequent
statement is the totality of the circumstances. 42 The specific facts of
Marenghi involved police officers and agents of the Maine Drug En-
forcement Agency (MDEA) who pulled over the appellant while she
was driving a car that was occupied by five others. 143 The officers
were investigating the distribution of crack cocaine in Portland,
Maine. 144 The agents searched the vehicle, handcuffed the defendant,
and placed her in the back of one of the police cars. 145 One police
officer told the defendant that her vehicle would be taken to the Port-
land police station and searched for drugs, and that her person and
vehicle would be searched by dogs.146 After several warnings about
136. See Leon v. Wainright, 734 F.2d 770, 771-72 (11th Cir. 1984).
137. See id.
138. Id. at 772.
139. Id. at 771.
140. See United States v. Marenghi, 109 F.3d 28, 33 (1st Cir. 1997).
141. Id. at 30.
142. Id. at 33.
143. Id. at 30.
144. See id.
145. See id.
146. See id.
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the dogs and their ability to find any evidence hidden in the vehicle,
the defendant said that their presence would not be necessary and that
she did possess crack cocaine. 147 The defendant stated that she
needed to use the bathroom on several different occasions, but she
was never read her Miranda rights. 148 Eventually she was transported
to a police station where she was read her Miranda rights.' 49 While
there, she dictated an oral confession detailing her involvement in the
cocaine ring in Maine. 150 She then signed a written statement af-
firming the same. 51 The district court suppressed her roadside state-
ments at trial because they were made while she was in custody and
unadvised of her Miranda rights.1 52 She challenged the admission of
the written statement that she made at the police station.153
The court, in analyzing her challenge, stated that the circumstances
under which the earlier roadside statements were made and whether
the police conduct was coercive impacted the admissibility of the sub-
sequent written statement. 154 The court noted that "[w]hen law en-
forcement officials do not deliberately engage in coercive or improper
tactics in obtaining an initial statement, but rather only fail to advise a
defendant of his or her Miranda" rights, the statement is admissible if
it meets a two-prong test. 55 Under this test, the subsequent "state-
ment is admissible if it was obtained after the defendant: (1) was ad-
vised of his or her Miranda rights; and, (2) [the defendant] knowingly
and voluntarily waived those rights. ' '156 If neither the initial nor sub-
sequent admissions were coerced, the finder of fact may reasonably
conclude that the suspect waived his rights. 157 When the problem with
the admission of the underlying statements is greater than a failure to
advise the defendant of his Miranda rights, the admissibility of the
subsequent statement is more difficult.' 58 In this case, the court noted
that it could not determine the admissibility of the subsequent state-
ment solely by examining the circumstances surrounding that state-
ment.1 59 "Instead, it must determine whether the subsequent
147. See id.
148. See id.
149. See id.
150. See id. at 31.
151. See id.
152. See id.
153. See id.
154. See id.
155. Id. at 31-32.
156. Marenghi, 109 F.3d at 32.
157. See id. (citing Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 312 (1985)).
158. See id.
159. See id.
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statement is sufficiently removed from the milieu of the coerced state-
ment so as to preclude any lingering taint."'1 60
The court began its analysis "by examining the voluntariness of the
written statement independent of any potential taint from the road-
side. ' 161 The court then compared and contrasted "the circumstances
surrounding each statement. ' 162 Several factors aided the court's
analysis in determining the voluntariness of the second statement
under the totality of the circumstances, including, "the change in the
place of the interrogations; the time that passed between the state-
ments; and the change in the identity of the interrogators."'' 63 The
factors in Marenghi suggested to the court "that the written statement
was sufficiently attenuated from any [roadside] coercion so as to en-
sure [ ] it was not tainted."'1 64 First, several hours passed between the
statements made at the roadside and the statements made at the po-
lice station.1 65 "Second, the appellant dictated the written statement
in a lunch room at the police station. ' 166 Third, there was "no sugges-
tion that any of the 'possibly' coercive elements from the roadside...
were present at [the police station]. ' 167 Finding that the statements
made at the police station were not tainted by those made at the road-
side, the court held that the subsequent statement was voluntary and
therefore admissible. 168
In the U.S. Supreme Court case of United States v. Bayer, the lapse
of time between confessions was several months, as opposed to hours
or days.169 The defendant in Bayer was placed under arrest and con-
fined to the psychiatric ward of a military hospital. 70 The defendant
was interrogated while in custody and was denied communication with
counsel and family; he was also deprived of basic hospital facilities.'71
Seemingly in response to the coercive circumstances, the defendant
confessed. 172 Six months later, the defendant confessed a second
160. Id.
161. Id. at 33.
162. See id. at 33-34.
163. Id. at 33.
164. Id.
165. See id. at 33-34.
166. Id. at 34.
167. Id.
168. See id.
169. See United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 539-40 (1947).
170. See id. at 539.
171. See id.
172. Cf. id. at 539. The Court described how the defendant
was placed under arrest and confined in the psychopathic ward in the station hospital.
Here, for some time, he was denied callers, communication, comforts and facilities
which it is needless to detail. Charges... were not promptly served on him... nor was
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time. 73 The Court held that the second confession was not involun-
tary and therefore admissible because the defendant was given fair
warning that his statements might be used against him. Additionally,
the Court found that during the six-month interval, it was clear that
the coercive conditions surrounding the first confession had been
removed.174
C. Identity of Interrogators, Physical Coercion, and False Promises
The cases cited above demonstrated that changing interrogation lo-
cations, allowing for the passage of time, and changing interrogators
can remove the taint of earlier unlawful interrogations. Accordingly,
a court may find that the presence of the same official who conducted
the preceding illegal interrogation may suggest that the earlier coer-
cive environment has not sufficiently dissipated.1 75 Specifically, if the
interrogator in the second interrogation also participated in the pre-
ceding illegal interrogation or was aware of the contents produced
from the earlier interrogation, the court is more likely to find state-
ments garnered from the second interrogation to be involuntary. 176
A change in the interrogator's identity was one of the focal points in
the case of United States v. Karake.177 The defendants in Karake were
Rwandan nationals charged with the murder of two U.S. tourists in
Uganda. 178 After suffering repeated beatings and other abuses at the
he taken before a magistrate for arraignment on any charges .... Meanwhile, under
such restraint, he made a first confession . . . . Without more, we will assume this
confession to be inadmissible ....
Id.
173. See id. at 540.
174. See id. at 541.
175. See People v. Heron, 657 N.Y.S.2d 694, 695 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (holding that the
coercive conditions had sufficiently dissipated partly because a different officer conducted the
second round of questioning without the presence of the officer who conducted the first
interrogation).
176. See United States v. Karake, 443 F. Supp. 2d 8, 88 (D.D.C. 2006).
177. See id.
[S]uspects interrogated by U.S. officers overseas should receive greater Fifth Amend-
ment protections than those envisioned by the Bin Laden court. These should include:
extending Fifth Amendment protections to suspects interrogated by U.S. agents over-
seas, whether those suspects are tried in the United States or in United States courts
located abroad; placing a burden on the government to show that a lawyer was not
reasonably available at the time of interrogation; and increasing the scrutiny of allega-
tions of waiver.
Fred Medick, Exporting Miranda. Protecting the Right Against Self-Incrimination When U.S. Of-
ficers Perform Custodial Interrogations Abroad, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 173, 188 (2009); See
Jenny-Brooke Condon, Extraterritorial Interrogation: The Porous Border Between Torture and
U.S. Criminal Trials, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 647, 650-652 (arguing that Karake stands as an exam-
ple of the U.S. government's efforts to rely on extraterritorial confessions derived from torture).
178. See Karake, 443 F. Supp. 2d at 12.
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hands of Rwandan officials, the defendants involuntarily confessed to
the murders. 179 Importantly, the defendants' subsequent confessions
to U.S. officials who did not physically abuse them were also deemed
involuntary. 180 The court focused specifically on the fact that
Rwandan officials continued to be involved in the interrogations by
U.S. officials, and that the defendants remained in Rwandan custody
during the U.S. interrogations. 181 Perhaps most salient for purposes
of this Article is the fact that there was no break-from the viewpoint
of the defendants-in the repeated beatings prior to the U.S. officials'
interrogations of the defendants. 182 The court noted that because
such factors were present, viewed in the aggregate, the defendants
reasonably could have believed that the Rwandan and U.S. officials
were engaged in a joint venture of coercive abuse.1 83 Accordingly,
the court held that the coercive influences created by the Rwandan
officials had not sufficiently dissipated.1 84
The Karake case is not only an example of changed interrogators,
but it also stands as a particularly brutal example of physical abuse.
When physical coercion or threats of physical harm induce the first
confession, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that such an atmosphere
may render all subsequent statements to be considered coerced and
therefore inadmissible. 18 5 The Supreme Court in Lyons explained
that "[t]he effect of earlier abuse may be so clear as to forbid any
other inference than that it dominated the mind of the accused to such
an extent that the later confession is involuntary.' 86 It can be in-
ferred from this language that the more severe the abuse, the higher
the likelihood of its continued influence on subsequent statements.
Thus, abuse rising to the level of torture or cruel, inhumane, or de-
grading treatment will have a greater chance of perpetually tainting
later statements than milder forms of physical abuse such as shoving,
pushing, or poking.
One example of how even the threat of abuse can render a subse-
quent statement involuntary is found in People v. Mayorga.187 In that
case, a New York court found that the coercion had not sufficiently
179. Id.
180. See id. at 87-88.
181. See id. at 26.
182. See id. passim (describing in detail the extensive beatings).
183. See id. at 78.
184. See id. at 89.
185. See Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596, 603 (1944); People v. Mayorga, 474 N.Y.S.2d 99,
101 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984).
186. Lyons, 322 U.S. at 603.
187. See Mayorga, 474 N.Y.S.2d at 101.
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dissipated when police arrested the defendant in a car at gunpoint
and, without giving him his Miranda warnings, interrogated him while
making additional threats of violence. 188 Agents assigned to the Long
Island Drug Enforcement Task Force removed him from his vehicle at
gunpoint, patted him down, and asked if he knew what was going
on.189 "During the trip, Miranda warnings were administered and the
defendant stated that" he would have made $500 on the drug transac-
tion that the agents had interrupted.1 90 After he arrived at the station,
detectives told the defendant that he could help himself if he would
tell them and show them who was engaged in selling cocaine. 191 The
defendant was again advised of his Miranda rights, and he subse-
quently initialed a waiver form.192 He proceeded to make a detailed
oral confession that was reduced to writing and signed.1 93 At trial, the
defendant objected to the admission of the oral confession into evi-
dence, 194 but the admission was admitted, and the defendant was con-
victed of the criminal sale of a controlled substance in the second
degree.1 95 The appellate court considered a "practical 'assessment of
external events"' and "conclude[d] that the defendant was 'subjected
to such a continuous interrogation' that the Miranda warnings subse-
quently administered 'were insufficient to protect his rights.""' 96
"[T]he record indicated that the defendant's purported agreement to
help the officers was neither spontaneous nor the result of an indepen-
dent, voluntary act by the defendant. 1 97 Rather, "[i]t was initiated by
the arresting officers and ... was part of [the interrogation]. '"1 98 Thus,
there was no break in the interrogation of the defendant, and the con-
fession should not have been admitted in court. 199 The appellate
court also found that the defendant's statements were not made of the
defendant's own free will, but they were instead the product of the
initial threats of violence.200 It is important to note, however, that not
all involuntary statements are the product of threats of physical vio-
lence. The Supreme Court has noted that
188. See id. at 100.
189. See id.
190. See id.
191. See id.
192. See id.
193. See id. at 100-01.
194. See id. at 101.
195. See id. at 100.
196. Id. (quoting People v. Chapple, 38 N.Y.2d 112, 115 (1975)).
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. See id.
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coercion can be mental as well as physical, and that the blood of the
accused is not the only hallmark of an unconstitutional inquisition.
A number of cases have demonstrated, if demonstration were
needed, that the efficiency of the rack and the thumbscrew can be
matched, given the proper subject, by more sophisticated modes of
"persuasion."20
For example, in United States v. Lopez, a murder suspect's initial
confession was induced by improper promises of leniency.20 2 The de-
fendant's second confession came twelve hours later, after he slept
overnight and ate a meal. Despite the absence of physical abuse and
the length of time between confessions, the Tenth Circuit found the
second confession to be involuntary. 20 3 The court explained that in
giving the subsequent confession, the defendant was still relying upon
the previous promise of leniency. The court also noted that the same
agent was the primary interrogator during the second interview, lend-
ing credence to the idea that the earlier coercion influenced the volun-
tariness of the second statement.20 4
D. The "Cat out of the Bag" Rule
While the "totality of the circumstances" can inform a court as to
the voluntariness of a statement subsequent to an earlier involuntary
statement, the possibility also exists that a defendant who involunta-
rily confessed may make other incriminating statements in the belief
that nothing more he says can cause him any additional damage.
Stated more colloquially, the "cat is out of the bag" and no additional
harm (in the defendant's eyes) can flow from a reaffirmation of the
earlier statement. Courts have developed a rule to account for this
situation: the "cat out of the bag" rule. This rule developed because,
in the words of the Supreme Court, the "traditional totality-of-the-
circumstances test" posed an "unacceptably great" risk that some in-
voluntary confessions would escape detection.20 5
The Supreme Court first acknowledged this rule in Bayer, stating
that "after an accused has once let the cat out of the bag by confess-
ing, no matter what the inducement, he is never thereafter free of the
psychological and practical disadvantages of having confessed. He
can never get the cat back in the bag."' 20 6 In such circumstances, a
subsequent statement is always influenced by the first and "may be
201. Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206 (1960).
202. See United States v. Lopez, 437 F.3d 1059, 1065 (10th Cir. 2006).
203. See id.
204. See id. at 1066.
205. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 442 (2000).
206. United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 540 (1947).
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looked upon as fruit of the first. '207 Admissibility under the "cat out
of the bag" rule depends on whether the defendant felt "so commit-
ted" by a prior statement that "he believe[d] it futile to assert his
right[ ]" to remain silent prior to making a subsequent statement. 20 8
The U.S. Supreme Court has had a few opportunities to examine
the "cat out of the bag" rule. In Oregon v. Elstad, a witness to a bur-
glary tipped off police as to the defendant Elstad's commission of the
crime, and they went to Elstad's home with a warrant and arrested
him.20 9 Without administering Miranda warnings, police questioned
Elstad alone.210 The defendant acknowledged that he had heard
about the burglary, and after an officer stated that he thought Elstad
was involved, the defendant admitted that he was there.211 Based on
this inculpatory statement, Elstad was taken to the police station and
read his Miranda rights. The defendant waived his rights, gave police
a signed confession, and was charged with first-degree burglary.212 On
appeal, the Oregon appellate court relied on the cat-out-of-the-bag
theory and concluded that both Elstad's confession after the Miranda
warnings and the statements made prior to the warnings should have
been excluded. 213 Upon review, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that
the Fifth Amendment does not require the "suppression of a confes-
sion, made after proper Miranda warnings and a valid waiver of rights,
solely because the police had obtained an earlier voluntary but un-
warned admission from the defendant. '214 A natural consequence of
this holding was that police and other agents may have an incentive to
initially question suspects without Mirandizing them, then read them
their rights and subsequently question them again.
More recently, the U.S. Supreme Court in Missouri v. Seibert, ac-
knowledging the potential consequences of Elstad, sought to reestab-
lish the "cat out of the bag" doctrine.2 15 In Seibert, the Court struck
down the police practice of first obtaining an inadmissible confession
without Miranda warnings and then issuing warnings to obtain subse-
quent cleaned up confessions.216 According to the Court, the thresh-
old question in the face of such practices is "whether it would be
207. Id.
208. People v. Tanner, 292 N.E.2d 98, 99-100 (1972).
209. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 300 (1985).
210. See id. at 301-02.
211. See id. at 301.
212. See id. at 301-02.
213. See id. at 302-03.
214. Id. at 298, 303. 314.
215. Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 627 (2004).
216. See id. at 612-14.
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reasonable to find that in these circumstances the warnings could
function 'effectively.' 217 The Court hypothetically asked, "Could the
warnings effectively advise the suspect that he had a real choice about
giving an admissible statement at that juncture? Could they reasona-
bly convey that he could choose to stop talking even if he had talked
earlier?" 218 The Court concluded that "unless the warnings could
place a suspect who has just been interrogated in a position to make
such an informed choice, there is no practical justification for ac-
cepting the [subsequent] formal warnings" as sufficient to satisfy the
requirements for admissibility of the subsequent statement.21 9 There-
fore a court should not treat the subsequent interrogation "as distinct
from the first, unwarned and inadmissible segment. '220
The Court qualified its language, stating that simply failing to ad-
minister Miranda warnings "unaccompanied by any actual coercion or
other circumstances calculated to undermine the suspect's ability to
exercise his free will" does not perpetually taint subsequent voluntary
statements.22' "[A] suspect who has once responded to unwarned, yet
uncoercive questioning" is not precluded from waiving his rights and
providing admissible statements after he has been given the requisite
warnings.222
E. Summary of Juridical Tests for Admissibility and Voluntariness
Taken together, what do these various juridical tests tell us about
what test to apply to the statements of Guantanamo detainees? The
Karake court faced a similar issue, and it had to synthesize many of
the precedents discussed in this Article in order to analyze a factual
setting that was similar to those that face courts reviewing statements
obtained from Guantanamo detainees.
In Karake, the court began with the presumption that voluntariness
is the "cornerstone of the due process analysis. '223 The court stated,
When a confession challenged as involuntary is sought to be used
against a criminal defendant at his trial ... the prosecution must
prove by at least a preponderance of the evidence that the confes-
sion was voluntary. To meet its burden, the government must
demonstrate that each of defendants' confessions was the product of
an essentially free and unconstrained choice. If the defendant's will
217. Id. at 611-12.
218. Id. at 612.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 612 n.4.
222. Id.
223. United States v. Karake, 443 F. Supp. 2d 8. 49 n.72 (D.D.C. 2006).
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has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically
impaired, the use of his confession offends due process. Whether a
confession was made freely, voluntarily, and without compulsion or
inducement of any sort, is distinct from the question of whether the
confession is accurate or reliable. Indeed, the probable truth or fal-
sity of a confession is not a permissible standard under the Due Pro-
cess Clause on the question [of] whether the confession was
voluntary and admissible. 224
Rather, as a long line of U.S. Supreme Court precedent makes clear,
confessions which are involuntary, i.e., the product of coercion, ei-
ther physical or psychological, cannot stand. This is so not because
such confessions are unlikely to be true but because the methods
used to extract them offend an underlying principle in the enforce-
ment of our criminal law: that ours is an accusatorial and not an
inquisitorial system-a system in which the State must establish
guilt by evidence independently and freely secured and may not by
coercion prove its charge against an accused out of his own
mouth.225
The Karake court highlighted not only the importance of sup-
pressing coerced confessions due to the coercive impact on the victim,
but also highlighted the institutional impact on the judiciary of admit-
ting such statements: "A coerced confession is offensive to basic stan-
dards of justice, not because the victim has a legal grievance against
the police, but because declarations procured by torture are not prem-
ises from which a civilized forum will infer guilt. '226 The court noted
that
[t]his is not to say that the exclusionary rule under the Fifth Amend-
ment does not serve a judicial interest in assuring reliable evidence.
Beyond the general goal of deterring improper police conduct, the
Fifth Amendment serves to protect the fairness of the trial itself.
[T]he Fifth Amendment goal of assuring trustworthy evidence exists
independent of any deterrent effect the exclusionary rule might
have under some circumstances. Thus, while a confession obtained
by means of torture may be excluded on due process grounds as
[in]consistent with the fundamental principles of liberty and justice
which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions, another
legitimate reason to suppress it is the likelihood that the confession
is untrue.227
As the Karake court explained,
The Court's role when faced with an allegedly coerced confession is
to enforce[ I the strongly felt attitude of our society that important
224. Karake, 443 F. Supp. 2d at 49-50 (citations omitted) (quotation marks omitted) (synthe-
sizing precedent).
225. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 540-41 (1961) (collecting cases).
226. Karake, 443 F. Supp. 2d at 50 (quoting Lyons, 322 U.S. at 605).
227. Id. at 50-51 (citations omitted) (quotation marks omitted).
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human values are sacrificed where an agency of the government, in
the course of securing a conviction, wrings a confession out of an
accused against his will. To do this without unduly impairing the
acknowledged need for police questioning as a tool for effective en-
forcement of criminal laws, the Court must conduct an examination
of all the attendant circumstances surrounding the confession. This
totality of circumstances inquiry requires consideration of both the
characteristics of the accused and the details of the
interrogation....
A finding of coercion, however, need not depend upon actual vio-
lence by a government agent; a credible threat is sufficient. For, as
recognized by the Supreme Court, the blood of the accused is not
the only hallmark of an unconstitutional inquisition. Thus, less
traditional forms of coercion, including psychological torture, as
well as the conditions of confinement have been considered by
courts in their assessment of the voluntariness of the statements....
Both for purposes of assessing the voluntariness of a statement
under principles of due process and for judging the adequacy of a
waiver of one's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimina-
tion under Miranda, a court must consider the circumstances sur-
rounding the interrogation, as well as the length of the detention
and the conditions of confinement.228
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THESE TESTS
The Obama Administration's disclosure of the OLC memos exam-
ining certain interrogation techniques, combined with the statements
of former officials and the ICRC documents, corroborate the fact that
KSM was subjected to waterboarding and other physical coercion by
the CIA.229 The next question is whether his subsequent statements
to "clean teams" or public statements in his CSRT hearing were vol-
untary or were tainted by the CIA's previous coercive conduct.
Under both the "totality of circumstances" and the "cat out of the
bag" analyses detailed above, KSM's statements may be deemed in-
voluntary. However, under the Military Commissions Act of 2006
(MCA), involuntariness is not enough. 230 MCA § 948r requires fur-
ther analysis to determine whether the statement should be sup-
pressed.231 In order to find KSM's statements admissible, the coercive
setting that tainted his previous statements to the CIA must have been
sufficiently dissipated. The primary determining factors in this cir-
cumstance will be the nature of the previous unlawful interrogation,
228. Karake, 443 F. Supp. 2d at 51-52 (quotation marks omitted) (collecting cases).
229. See supra notes 21-39 and accompanying text.
230. Military Commissions Act of 2006, 10 U.S.C. § 948 (2006).
231. Id. § 948r.
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the lapse of time between statements, whether there was a change in
location, and whether there was a change in the identity of the
interviewer.2 32
The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that whenever physical coercion
or threats of physical harm induces the first confession, the atmos-
phere may be perpetually coercive, thus rendering all subsequent
statements involuntary. The CIA's alleged repeated use of the
waterboarding technique on KSM to simulate drowning and to make
him believe that his life was in danger was likely to have an irrepara-
ble impact on his will, thereby creating an environment of coercion.
An individual who is subjected to such measures may at some point
say whatever he thinks the interrogator wants to hear, without regard
to truth or accuracy. Many of KSM's confessions appear to fall into
that category. For instance, he confessed to being responsible for
thirty-one different terrorist plots worldwide, including the failed
"shoe bomb" operation, the night club bombing in Bali, Indonesia,
and even the murder of journalist Daniel Pearl. However, several in-
telligence experts have openly criticized the veracity of these confes-
sions.233 On the other hand, some CIA officials cautioned that "many
of [KSM's] claims during interrogation were 'white noise' designed to
send the U.S. on a wild goose chase, ' 234 and he in fact has admitted to
lying to CIA officials. 235 Nevertheless, in light of the prolonged abu-
sive nature of the interrogations of KSM, a court may find that all
subsequent statements were tainted by the earlier torture.
However, the time between his statements and the change in loca-
tion and identity of his interrogators may render his subsequent state-
ments voluntary. Recall that KSM was transferred to Guantanamo in
September 2006 and that he gave his subsequent statements to the
"clean team" weeks later, and to the CSRT panel six months later, in
March 2007. If one assumes that KSM was not subjected to any un-
232. See supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text, regarding circumstances which can dissi-
pate taint.
233. For a collection of quotes from military and intelligence officials concluding that en-
hanced techniques do not yield reliable intelligence, see http://thinkprogress.org/why-enhanced-
interrogation-failed/#Ia (quoting General David Petraeus, Major General Thomas Romig, FBI
Memoranda, and other sources). For a contrary view, see MARC A. THIESSEN, COURTING Dis-
ASTER: How THE CIA KEPT AMERICA SAFE AND How BARACK OBAMA IS INVITING THE NEXT
ATTACK (2010).
234. See Robert Baer, Why KSM's Confession Rings False, TIME, Mar. 15, 2007; Posting of
Robert to Jihad Watch, Officials: Khalid Sheikh Muhammad Exaggerated Claims, http://www.
jihadwatch.org (Mar. 15, 2007, 7:06 PM); Posting of Jonathan Stein to Mojo, Mainstream Media
Catching UP on KSM Doubts, http://motherjones.com/mojo (Mar. 16, 2007, 2:22 PM PDT).
235. See Transcript of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Hearing for ISN 10024, supra note
23, at 15.
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lawful coercion during this six-month period, the Bayer precedent may
aid the government's case. Recall that in Bayer the Supreme Court
found that six months was sufficient to fully dispel a coercive atmos-
phere.236 However, in Bayer, the defendant was not subjected to tor-
ture; rather, he was deprived of basic hospital services and denied
access to counsel, family, and friends.237 In those circumstances, six
months was sufficient time to cure the coercive environment. In
KSM's case, however, he was subjected to extremely abusive conduct
for over two years. Under these circumstances, a court may find that
a few months time may not be sufficient to fully mitigate the coercive
effects of the earlier abuse.
Similarly, while the transfer of KSM from CIA custody to Depart-
ment of Defense custody-with interrogations conducted by the FBI
in a non-coercive setting-may serve to lessen the impact of KSM's
earlier abuse, it is possible that from his perspective, this was just an-
other ploy by the CIA. In fact, in his CSRT statement, KSM seemed
to indicate that he believed he was still in the custody of the CIA. 238
In his CSRT hearing, KSM referenced the term "enemy combatant,"
the label and status the CSRT panel was adjudicating, and he noted
how he believed it was a term the CIA invented.239 This fact, com-
bined with the fact that KSM's earlier treatment probably involved
frequent changes in location and interrogators, suggests that the new
circumstances in Guantanamo did not indicate better treatment to
KSM; rather, changes in personnel and surroundings may have actu-
ally reinforced KSM's belief that no matter where he went, he would
be subject to physical abuse.
If a military tribunal judge determines that KSM's statements were
involuntary, the judge will need to apply the framework established in
MCA § 948r.2 40 Torture is the first issue addressed under § 948r. The
Section provides that a statement produced by torture is inadmissible,
regardless of its probative value. 241 There is debate as to whether
waterboarding constitutes torture. Organizations, such as Human
236. 331 U.S. 532, 541 (1947).
237. See id. at 541-542.
238. See Transcript of Combatant Status Review Tribunal, Hearing for ISN 10024, supra note
23, at 23.
So this language of the war. Any people who, when Usama bin Laden say I'm waging
war because such such reason, now he declared it. But when you said I'm terrorist, I
think it is deceiving peoples. Terrorists, enemy combatant. All these definitions as CIA
you can make whatever you want.
Id. (emphasis added).
239. See id.
240. See Military Commissions Act of 2006, 10 U.S.C. § 948r (2006).
241. See id.
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Rights Watch, maintain that the use of this technique is indeed tor-
ture.242 The Bush Administration denied that waterboarding rose to
the level of torture, but the current Administration has repeatedly
stated that it believes that waterboarding is torture. 243 In light of this
fact, such a challenge may be a moot point. However, if challenged,
and if a military tribunal judge finds that waterboarding constitutes
torture, KSM's statements would be suppressed as involuntary state-
ments derived from torture. If, however, the tribunal determines that
waterboarding or other tactics used-such as stress positions-are not
torture, then the statements will be subjected to further scrutiny.
When a military tribunal judge determines whether KSM's involun-
tary statements were extracted through non-torturous measures, the
admissibility of the statements will hinge on three factors: whether
they were given before the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA);
whether the statements have probative value; and if the interest of
justice requires their admission. 244 KSM has been in custody since
2003. His involuntary statements span the temporal limits established
by the DTA and were likely elicited both prior to and after the DTA's
effective date of December 30, 2005. Any statements obtained after
December 30, 2005 will thus be subject to an analysis under constitu-
tional law principles grounded in the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution, suggesting that most subsequent in-
voluntary statements will be excluded. KSM's pre-DTA statements
will be analyzed based on their probative value. For example, a judge
may seek to corroborate the statements against other evidence such as
the information contained on his hard drive or provided by other de-
tainees. If this evidence corroborates KSM's statements, then the mil-
itary judge may find that his statements are sufficiently probative.
Finally, a military tribunal judge must determine whether the interest
of justice requires admitting the statements. Factors that the judge
will likely consider are the integrity of the judiciary, the fact that KSM
is alleged to be the mastermind of the September 11th attacks, the
persuasive value of the evidence, and whether alternative evidence
can reasonably establish guilt.
The MCA does not directly address the admissibility of voluntary
post-abuse statements. However, jurisprudence on voluntariness does
242. See U.S. Vice President Endorses Torture, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Oct. 25, 2006, http:/l
www.hrw.org/english/docs/2006/10/26/usdom14465.htm.
243. See Associated Press, Obama's AG Pick Earns Praise, GOP Support, MSNBC, Jan. 16,
2009, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/28672011/ ("Holder declared waterboarding to be a form of
torture, and he outlined numerous ways in which the incoming Obama administration will break
sharply with the Bush administration's counterterrorism policies.").
244. See Military Commissions Act of 2006, 10 U.S.C. § 948r (2006).
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provide a useful analytical framework for determining the admissibil-
ity of subsequent voluntary statements. In particular, the "totality of
circumstances" test and the "cat out of the bag" test both provide use-
ful lenses for analyzing voluntary statements procured after earlier co-
ercive, abusive, or even torturous conduct. Under the totality of
circumstances test, a subsequent statement will be suppressed unless
the government can show that the coercive setting that tainted the
preceding statement has sufficiently dissipated so as to make the sec-
ond statement voluntary. Alternatively, the "cat out of the bag" rule
is applied to account for instances in which a defendant who involun-
tarily confessed makes other incriminating statements in the belief
that nothing more he says can cause him any additional harm. Under
this analysis, admissibility will depend on whether the defendant felt
so committed to his prior statement that he believed it futile to invoke
his right to remain silent prior to making the subsequent statement. If
either test reveals that a statement was involuntary, then a court must
apply MCA § 948r to determine admissibility.
V. CONCLUSION
KSM and other high-value detainees were subjected to coercive in-
terrogation, abuse, and perhaps torture at the hands of U.S. investiga-
tors who for ill or for good were seeking intelligence information from
him and his co-conspirators. While these detainees may not have
been protected from the collection of such intelligence by abusive
means, those means of collection may have perpetually impacted the
admissibility of subsequent statements-including those derived by
non-coercive means. Fully analyzing the admissibility of such subse-
quent statements requires an analysis of the voluntariness and totality
of the circumstances tests, which courts have applied in a variety of
interrogation circumstances. Many factors-such as the time in be-
tween statements; whether there was a change in the place of interro-
gations; whether the identity of the interrogators changed; the nature
of the previous unlawful interrogation methods; and whether the ille-
gally procured statement was used to leverage the subsequent state-
ment-can impact a court's judgment and are by their very nature
difficult to assess by commentators without access to information re-
garding the facts and circumstances surrounding the subsequent and
earlier interrogations.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
When this Article went to press, the U.S. Congress was considering
modifying provisions of the MCA. 245 In particular, members of the
Obama Administration were specifically concerned with the types of
statements described in this Article, focusing their attention on requir-
ing "a voluntariness standard for the admission of other statements of
the accused-albeit a voluntariness standard that takes account of the
challenges and realities of the battlefield and armed conflict. ' '2 46 If
this standard is adopted by congressional reformers, courts will likely
find that the application of a voluntariness standard to subsequent
voluntary statements is a complex, fact-intensive inquiry, which may
mean that some inculpatory statements made by high-value detainees
will need to be excluded either to protect the rights of the detainee, or
to protect the integrity of the judiciary.
245. See Prosecuting Terrorists: Civilian and Military Trials for GTMO and Beyond: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2009), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/
hearings/hearing.cfm?id=4002.
246. Id. (testimony of David Kris, Assistant Att'y Gen. for Nat'l Sec.), available at http:II
judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=4002&witid=8156.
[Vol. 59:943
